Page 102 - index
P. 102

lnw; t.hey were raid to be deterniinations of  what  the  1aw
                                         should lie.
                                           Assuniing this ta be  so, there is sonie reason  to  suppose,
                                         froin Lamoignon's preliminary  inquiries  and  proceedings
                                         before publishing his arrêtés, that he evolved the principle
                                         of  An.êt.6 50 from decisions of  the  Parlianient  of  Paris.
                                         Thc jurisprudence  haviiiy taken a direction which  left  the
                                         qiiestion to be deteiniined in each case hy the Court on the
                                         view of its eircuinst,auces, had prodiirr+~i uncertainty,  and
                                         this inconvenience he wished  to prevent  by a definiterule.
                                           Whntever may have been the diversity of  opinions and
                                         decisions on the subject. thc general effect of  t,hern points
                                         irresistihly  to the conclusion tha.t brfore  the  Ordinonce  of
                                         1731, the Raman law, "Si  uiiyuaiii,"  bad  not  heen  intro-
                                         duced in al1 its fullness in Francc, at Ieast iiito that part  of
                                         it  nithin  the jiirisdictioii  of the Parliameiit  of  Paris.  It
                                         seems to their  I~>i.dshipü that, before that Ordinance, the
                                         lau~ had,  in pffect, hecome  this,  that  donations were not
                                         revokcd  hy the hirth of  children, when theproperty given
                                         was not  of  large value in rclation to the entire estate of the
                                         donor, and it could be  presunied, from the  circumstances
                                         of the particular casel thn.t the gift would have been made
                                         if the donor had contemplated t,he biith of children.  These
                                         questions in case of  dispute aould, necesa~ily, be  decided
                                          by the Courts.
                                           It waa  urgcd that a rule ahich reqiiired the decision of
                                         a Court on  these questions could  not  be the true one, as
                                         heing  inconsistent  with  the  principln  which  irnplies  the
                                         existence of a iesolutire condition in the gift itself; but this
                                         is really not 90:  for if  the nilr be m above supposed, the le-
                                         gal effect of it  woiild ho, that in a given state of facts the
                                          Inn- did not attach the resolutive condition to the gift, but
                                         when that state of  facts dit not exist it did i~ttnch it.  The
                                         determination  I>J,  the Court,s of  the question of  fact in no
                                         way changes the legal nature of  thc condition  (if  there be
                                         one) as a remlutive condition.  When the facts are found
                                         in  one  way,  the  law  implies  tbat  the  gift  was always
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